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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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PITTSBURGH, d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist 
Church; TIMOTHY RALSTON, Individually and d/b/a Sixth 
Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; NATHANIEL 
YOUNG, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion 
Missionary Baptist Church; GEOFFREY KEVIN JOHNSON, 
Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist 
Church; ROCHELLE JOHNSON, Individually and d/b/a 
Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; ALEXANDER 
HALL, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary 
Baptist Church; RAYMOND JACKSON, Individually and 
d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; JAMES 
GROVER, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion 
Missionary Baptist Church; ARTHUR HARRIS, Individually 
and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church; 
JEROME TAYLOR, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount 
Zion Missionary Baptist Church; TOMMIE NELL TAYLOR, 
Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount Zion Missionary Baptist 
Church; ROY ELDER, Individually and d/b/a Sixth Mount 
Zion Missionary Baptist Church    
 2 
 




ON APPEAL FROM THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01599) 
District Judge: Hon. Nora B. Fischer 
______________ 
 
Argued July 12, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, ROTH, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.  
(Filed: September 5, 2018) 
 
Gregg L. Zeff [ARGUED] 
Zeff Law Firm, LLC 
100 Century Parkway, Ste 305 
Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Alan E. Cech 
Adam K. Hobaugh 
Murtagh, Hobaugh & Cech, LLC 
110 Swinderman Road 
Wexford, PA 15090 
 
Daniel Blomberg [ARGUED] 
Eric Rassbach 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
1200 New Hampshire Ave, NW 
 3 
 
Suite 700  
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for Appellee 
 
 
Andrew G.I. Kilberg 
David W. Casazza 
Brian M. Lipshutz 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP 
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae Church of God in 
Christ, Inc., mPact Churches, Plymouth 
Brethren, and Bishop William H. Stokes 
 
 
Todd R. Geremia 
Jones Day 
250 Vesey Street 
New York, NY 10281 
 
Victoria Dorfman 
Mark R. Kubisch 
Daniel D. Benson 
Jones Day 
51 Louisiana Avenue NW 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae Douglas Laycock, 
Michael W. McConnell, Thomas C. Berg, Carl 









SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Reverend Dr. William David Lee was terminated from 
his position as pastor of the Sixth Mount Zion Missionary 
Baptist Church (“the Church”) and sued the Church for 
allegedly breaching his employment contract.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment in the Church’s favor 
because the adjudication of Lee’s contract claim would 
impermissibly entangle the Court in religious doctrine in 
violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.  We 





In December 2012, the Church’s Deacon board 
recommended, and the Church voted unanimously to accept, 
Lee for the position of church pastor.  In March 2013, Lee and 
Church officials executed an employment contract (“the 
Agreement”) establishing that Lee would serve as the Church’s 
                                                                
1 Lee filed a motion for summary judgment, and each 
party filed a statement of material facts.  Lee did not respond 
to the Church’s statement of material facts, which were based 
on Lee’s deposition testimony and Church documents 
quantifying the financial and attendance decreases under Lee’s 
tenure.  Lee has not challenged the District Court’s use of the 
Church’s additional facts, and we will accept them too.   
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pastor for a twenty-year term, beginning December 2012 and 
subject to for-cause early termination.   If the Church removed 
Lee without cause before the twenty-year term expired, it 
would be required to pay Lee the salary and benefits he would 
have received for the unexpired term of the Agreement, subject 
to additional reductions.  The Agreement specified that Lee 
could be terminated for cause if he “commits any serious moral 
or criminal offense (“serious offense”)—including but not 
limited to adultery, embezzlement, or fraud—is convicted of a 
felony, or commits any other act which is a violation of 
applicable law” or if he became incapacitated through illness 
or injury.  App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3).  
  
The Agreement also allowed either party to terminate 
upon “material breach” of the Agreement and specified that the 
enumerated rights of termination existed in addition to “any 
other rights of termination allowed . . . by law.”  App. 39 
(Agreement § 12.3).  Under the Agreement, Lee agreed to 
“abide by the employment policies and procedures existing or 
established by the Church from time to time,” App. 37 
(Agreement § 7c) (capitalization altered).  This provision 
incorporated the Church’s constitution and bylaws and was a 
“material term” of the Agreement.  App. 38 (Agreement § 11).  
Furthermore, the Agreement required Lee to “lead the pastoral 
ministries of the Church and . . . work with the Deacons and 
Church staff in achieving the Church’s mission of proclaiming 
the Gospel to believers and unbelievers.”  App. 35 (Agreement 
§ 2.5) (capitalization altered). 
 
All executing parties understood that the congregation 
was required to approve the Agreement for it to become 
effective.  During an April 2013 congregation meeting, Lee 
acknowledged that his failure to perform his job “would 
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constitute cause for termination under the Agreement.”  App. 
165 ¶¶ 25-27.  He also said that “just cause” would occur if the 
Church “[was] not growing . . . [was] stagnant, . . . [or was] not 
a better place,” and that “if [he did not] perform [his] duties 
well, [he would be] out.”  App. 166-67 ¶¶ 28-32.  Based on 
these statements, the congregation approved the Agreement.  
    
Twenty months later, in December 2014, Church 
leaders gathered the congregation and recommended that the 
Church “vacate the pulpit immediately,” “void the pastor’s[] 
employment contract,” and approve the severance terms.  App. 
101 ¶ 16; App. 164 ¶ 16.  They presented three reasons for their 
recommendation: (1) “Failures in Financial Stewardship,” (2) 
“Failures in Spiritual Stewardship,” and (3) “Failure[s] to 
Respond to Church Leaders.”  App. 45.  Specifically, the 
Church reported that from 2013-14, there was a 39% decline 
in tithes and offerings, a 32% drop in Sunday morning worship 
attendance, a 61% decrease in registered members, a doubling 
of Church expenditures, and a decline in the quality of the 
Church’s community outreach.  Furthermore, according to the 
Church, Lee scheduled but then cancelled several meetings to 
discuss these financial and ministerial issues between June and 
December 2014.  Based on the recommendations of Church 
leaders, the congregation voted in January 2015 to terminate 




Lee filed a complaint against the Church and eleven of 
its deacons, alleging breach of contract due to termination 
without cause and seeking $2,643,996.40 in damages.  The 
District Court dismissed Lee’s claims against the individual 
deacons because they were not parties to the Agreement.   
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Lee moved for summary judgment on his breach of 
contract claim against the Church and both parties submitted 
briefs, with the Church asserting several defenses,2 including 
that Lee committed material breach of contract.  Lee did not 
file a reply brief.  After briefing, the District Court “became 
skeptical” that the case could proceed under the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses and 
ordered both parties to file additional briefs addressing whether 
the “ministerial exception,” grounded in the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment, prevented the court from adjudicating 
Lee’s contract claim.  Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Church of 
Pittsburg, Civ. No. 15-1599, 2017 WL 3608140, at *9 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 22, 2017).  After receiving supplemental briefs, the 
District Court determined that (1) the Agreement could be 
terminated by one party upon the other party’s material breach, 
(2) Lee failed to respond at all to the Church’s defenses, and 
(3) the matter could not proceed due to the application of the 
First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which restricts 
government involvement in religious affairs.  Id. at *15, 22, 37.  
The District Court therefore denied Lee’s motion for summary 
judgment and entered judgment in favor of the Church.  Id. at 
*37.  Lee appeals. 
                                                                
2 In addition to asserting Lee committed material breach 
of contract, the Church alleged the following defenses: lack of 
consideration, unconscionability, fraud in the inducement, 
fraud in the execution, duress, misrepresentation, and the 






We review orders granting summary judgment de novo.  
Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017).  
Summary judgment is warranted if a party shows there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
   
A court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving 
party, as long as the opposing party has notice and an 
opportunity to respond.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (“After 
giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may: 
(1) grant summary judgment for a nonmovant; (2) grant the 
motion on grounds not raised by a party; or (3) consider 
summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties 
material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”).  In fact, 
with notice to the parties, a court may enter summary judgment 
in favor of a non-moving party sua sponte.  Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (“[D]istrict courts are widely 
acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary 
judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice 
that she had to come forward with all of her evidence” 
(emphasis omitted)); Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 355 
F.3d 215, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2004) (recognizing authority “to 
allow a court to grant summary judgment to a non-moving 
party” but requiring that the other party is “on notice that the 
court is considering a sua sponte summary judgment motion” 
(emphasis and citation omitted)). 
                                                                
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Here, the District Court granted summary judgment to 
the Church, a non-moving party, after the District Court gave 
notice to the parties that it was considering the applicability of 
the ministerial exception and receiving supplemental briefing 
regarding “whether and to what extent the . . . exception . . . 
affects further adjudication of this matter.”  Lee, 2017 WL 
3608140, at *9.  The District Court’s order seeking arguments 
on the ministerial exception specifically referenced Rule 56(f), 
which allows courts to grant judgment to a non-moving party 
or grant judgment on grounds not raised by a party, thereby 
providing notice that it was considering entering summary 
judgment based on the ministerial exception.  Under these 
circumstances, Lee received adequate notice and opportunity 
to present all relevant arguments and evidence concerning the 
ministerial exception.  Accordingly, the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the Church, a non-moving 
party, was procedurally sound, and we will proceed to examine 
the merits.4  
                                                                
4 The ministerial exception is an affirmative defense.  
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4 (2012) (stating that the 
ministerial exception “operates as an affirmative defense to an 
otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar”).  
Although the District Court, not the Church, first raised the 
ministerial exception, the Church is not deemed to have waived 
it because the exception is rooted in constitutional limits on 
judicial authority.  See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding 
that a defendant “has not waived the ministerial-exception by 
failing to raise it . . . because ‘[t]his constitutional protection is 
. . . structural’” (citation omitted)); Conlon v. InterVarsity 





 Lee argues that the ministerial exception does not apply 
and the District Court erroneously granted judgment to the 
Church.  We disagree.  
 
 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S. Const. amend. I.  
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prevents 
“excessive government entanglement with religion,” while its 
Free Exercise Clause “protects not only the individual’s right 
to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires, 
but also a religious institution’s right to decide matters of faith, 
doctrine, and church governance.”   Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 
462 F.3d 294, 306, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  
  
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 181, 188 (2012), the 
Supreme Court recognized, based on these two Clauses, a 
“ministerial exception” that “bar[s] the government from 
                                                                
(explaining that Hosanna-Tabor’s rationale for recognizing the 
ministerial exception establishes that “the Constitution does 
not permit private parties to waive the First Amendment’s 
ministerial exception” because “[t]he constitutional protection 
is not only a personal one; it is a structural one that 
categorically prohibits federal and state governments from 
becoming involved in religious leadership disputes”).  
Moreover, Lee did not argue before the District Court that the 
Church waived the defense.  Therefore, it was appropriate for 
the District Court to consider the ministerial exception.          
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interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of 
its ministers.”  Hosanna-Tabor involved a disabled religion 
teacher who was fired from a religious school and sued, 
alleging that her termination violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  565 U.S. at 176-80.  The Supreme Court held, 
on a motion for summary judgment, that the suit was barred 
under the ministerial exception because “[t]he members of a 
religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers,” 
and “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted 
minister . . . . interferes with the internal governance of the 
church, depriving the church of control over the selection of 
those who will personify its beliefs.”  Id. at 180-81, 188-89, 
194.  “By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes 
the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s 
right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
appointments[,]” and “[a]ccording the state the power to 
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also 
violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government 
involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”  Id. at 188-89.  
Even though the discharged teacher did not seek reinstatement 
at the school and instead requested frontpay, “[a]n award of 
such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for 
terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less 
prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning 
the termination,” since it would still “depend on a 
determination that [the religious school] was wrong to have 
relieved [the teacher] of her position, and it is precisely such a 
ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception.”  Id. at 194. 
    
 Hosanna-Tabor involved a statutorily-based 
employment discrimination suit, and the Supreme Court 
explicitly declined to state whether the ministerial exception 
“bars other types of suits, including actions by employees 
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alleging breach of contract . . . by their religious employers.”  
Id. at 196.  Before Hosanna-Tabor, our Court recognized that 
the ministerial exception precludes, under the Free Exercise 
Clause, judicial action or application of state or federal law 
limiting a religious organization’s choice of spiritual 
messenger.  Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306, 310.  We also noted that 
“a church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily 
through contract, and such contracts are fully enforceable in 
civil court” because “[e]nforcement of a promise, willingly 
made and supported by consideration, in no way constitutes a 
state-imposed limit upon a church’s free exercise rights.”  Id. 
at 310 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Even 
assuming a church can contractually limit its free exercise 
rights,5 a court nonetheless must be cognizant of the ministerial 
exception when asked to adjudicate a contractual dispute, as a 
court’s resolution of the dispute may involve “excessive 
government entanglement with religion,” and thereby offend 
the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 311 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Such “[e]ntanglement may be 
substantive—where the government is placed in the position of 
deciding between competing religious views—or procedural—
where the state and church are pitted against one another in a 
protracted legal battle.”  Id.  Thus, a court may resolve only 
disputes that “turn[] on a question devoid of doctrinal 
implications” and “employ neutral principles of law to 
adjudicate.”  Askew v. Trs. of Gen. Assembly of Church of the 
Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 
418-19 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 
                                                                
5 Since we resolve this case on entanglement grounds, 
we need not address whether Hosanna-Tabor allows for 
contractual waiver of free exercise rights, as acknowledged in 
Petruska.      
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198, 207 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating that the ministerial exception 
is not a “complete barrier to suit” and that “a case may proceed 
if it involves a limited inquiry that . . . can prevent a wide-
ranging intrusion into sensitive religious matters” (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
  
 Here, the parties dispute whether Lee was properly 
terminated with or without cause in accordance with the 
employment agreement.  Section 12.3 of the Agreement allows 
either party to terminate the contract upon the “material 
breach” of the Agreement’s terms.6  App. 39.  Material breach 
                                                                
6 The Agreement provision states, in full: 
 
Termination for Cause: This AGREEMENT 
may be terminated at the option of either party 
upon thirty (30) days prior written notice by 
either party of the material breach of the terms of 
this AGREEMENT by the other party, which 
breach is not cured within such thirty (30) days.  
The rights of termination set forth in this contract 
are in addition to any other rights of termination 
allowed to either party by law.  Without limiting 
other rights or grounds for termination which the 
CHURCH may have under this Agreement or by 
law, it is agreed that the CHURCH may 
terminate this Agreement for cause upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events: 
 
i. The pastor commits any serious moral or 
criminal offense (“serious offense”)—
including but not limited to adultery, 
embezzlement, or fraud—is convicted of 
 14 
 
is not defined in the contract, but the Agreement identifies as a 
“material term” the requirement that Lee “[w]ill abide by the 
employment policies and procedures existing or established by 
the Church from time to time.”  App. 37 (Agreement § 7c), 38 
(§ 11).  The terms of the Agreement, which incorporate the 
Church’s constitution and bylaws, establish that Lee’s role as 
pastor involved spiritual leadership in furthering the mission of 
the Church and that he could be removed for failing in this role. 
   
The Church argues that Lee materially breached the 
Agreement by failing to provide adequate spiritual leadership, 
as reflected in decreased church contributions and attendance 
during Lee’s tenure.  In particular, the Church cites a report by 
a joint board of Deacons and Trustees discussing, among other 
things, Lee’s “failures in spiritual stewardship” reflected by a 
“drop in [the] number of registered members,” “drop in [the] 
number of Sunday morning worshippers,” and “drop in [the] 
level of tithes and offerings,” and concludes that the Church’s 
“capacity to cultivate new ambassadors for Christ has grown 
progressively more negative than positive over the two years 
                                                                
a felony, or commits any other act which 
is a violation of applicable law (except for 
misdemeanors or traffic offenses); or 
ii. The pastor becomes incapacitated by 
reason of illness, injury or other disability 
so that he cannot, in the reasonable good 
faith opinion of the Church, fully carry 
out and perform his duties and 
responsibilities under this Agreement for 
a period of at least six (6) months. 
 
App. 39 (Agreement § 12.3). 
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of Pastor Lee’s leadership,” “[he] dimi[ni]shed [the Church’s] 
capacity to fulfill the great mission” described in “Matt[hew] 
28:19-20,” and “[u]nder [his] leadership we were unable to 
launch and sustain the type of ministries likely to promote the 
spiritual health of families, neighborhoods, and the city.”  App. 
51-55 (emphasis omitted and capitalization altered).  Lee has 
not pointed to any materials in the record to contradict the 
Church’s reasons for his dismissal but instead responds that the 
case turns on “the question of whether or not the attendance 
and financial issues plaguing [the Church] were [Lee’s] 
fault. . . .”  Reply Br. at 3.  
  
While the amount of church contributions and members 
is a matter of arithmetic, assessing Lee’s role, if any, in causing 
decreased giving and reduced membership in the Church 
requires a determination of what constitutes adequate spiritual 
leadership and how that translates into donations and 
attendance—questions that would impermissibly entangle the 
court in religious governance and doctrine prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., Fratello v. Archdiocese of 
N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 203 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Judges are not well 
positioned to determine whether ministerial employment 
decisions rest on practical and secular considerations or 
fundamentally different ones that . . . are perfectly sensible—
and perhaps even necessary—in the eyes of the faithful.”); 
Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 209 (“[H]ow are we, as Article III 
judges, to gainsay the Congregatio Pro Clericis’ conclusion 
that Father Justinian is insufficiently devoted to ministry? How 
are we to assess the quality of his homilies?”); Minker v. Balt. 
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 
1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[E]valuation of the ‘gifts and 
graces’ of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions.” 
(citation omitted)).  Moreover, parsing the precise reasons for 
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Lee’s termination is akin to determining whether a church’s 
proffered religious-based reason for discharging a church 
leader is mere pretext, an inquiry the Supreme Court has 
explicitly said is forbidden by the First Amendment’s 
ministerial exception.  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95 
(rejecting the argument that a church’s religious-based reason 
for firing a teacher was mere pretext by explaining that the 
argument “misses the point of the ministerial exception,” 
which “is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister 
only when it is made for a religious reason” but “instead [to] 
ensure[] that the authority to select and control who will 
minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical,’—is 
the church’s alone” (citation omitted)), id. at 205-06 (Alito, J., 
& Kagan, J., concurring) (explaining that engaging in the 
pretext inquiry to “probe the real reason” for a church leader’s 
firing would require impermissible judgments about church 
doctrine and how important particular religious beliefs are 
(emphasis omitted)); see also Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 
1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is the decision [by a church to 
terminate a minister] itself which is exempt[;] the courts may 
not even look into the reasoning.”); Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 
207 (“[T]he First Amendment prohibits . . . [courts] from 
inquiring into an asserted religious motive to determine 
whether it is pretextual.” (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted)); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360 (“[A]ny inquiry into the 
Church’s reasons for asserting that [the pastor] was not suited 
for a particular pastorship would constitute an excessive 
entanglement in its affairs.”).  Such inquiry would intrude on 
internal church governance, require consideration of church 
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doctrine, constitute entanglement prohibited under the 
ministerial exception, and violate the Establishment Clause.7  
  
Our sister circuit courts have repeatedly dismissed 
breach of contract claims asserted by terminated religious 
leaders against their religious institution employers based on 
the ministerial exception.  See Bell v. Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329-32 (4th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. 
Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 
940, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1992); Natal v. Christian & Missionary 
                                                                
7 While we focus on entanglement, we are also mindful 
that the ministerial exception “applies to any claim, the 
resolution of which would limit a religious institution’s right 
to choose who will perform particular spiritual functions,” 
even outside the context of entanglement.  Petruska, 462 F.3d 
at 299.  Courts have recognized that church decisions regarding 
its choice of religious leader are especially sacrosanct, and any 
intrusion upon such decisions would violate the right of free 
exercise.  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 204; see also Werft, 
377 F.3d at 1103 (“[T]he ministerial relationship lies so close 
to the heart of the church that it would offend the Free Exercise 
Clause simply to require the church to articulate a religious 
justification for its personnel decisions.” (citation omitted)); 
Minker, 894 F.2d at 1356-57 (“[D]etermination of whose voice 
speaks for the church is per se a religious matter.  We cannot 
imagine an area of inquiry less suited to a temporal court for 
decision[.]”); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-
59 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The relationship between an organized 
church and its ministers is its lifeblood.  The minister is the 
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its 
purpose.  Matters touching this relationship must necessarily 
be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.”).   
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All., 878 F.2d 1575, 1576-77 (1st Cir. 1989); Hutchinson v. 
Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 392-96 (6th Cir. 1986).  Indeed, we are 
not aware of any court that has ruled on the merits (i.e., not 
applied the ministerial exception) of a breach of contract claim 
alleging wrongful termination of a religious leader by a 
religious institution.  Instead, there have been only cases 
allowing a discharged plaintiff the opportunity to proceed 
beyond the pleading stage and attempt to show with discovery 
that resolution of his or her claim would not entangle courts in 
internal religious doctrine and governance.  See Petruska, 462 
F.3d at 310-12 (vacating and remanding the district court’s 
dismissal of a chaplain’s breach of contract claim alleging that 
religious university changed—through restructuring—the 
responsibilities she was entitled to have, and stating that the 
claim at the “outset” did not turn on an ecclesiastical inquiry, 
but if further proceedings “raise issues which would result in 
excessive entanglement, the claims may be dismissed on that 
basis on summary judgment”); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1355, 
1359-61 (vacating and remanding the district court’s order 
dismissing a terminated pastor’s breach of oral contract claim 
alleging that the church did not live up to its promise to provide 
the pastor with a better placement at the earliest possible time; 
the court noted that the parties disputed whether a contract even 
existed, which could be resolved without intruding upon 
religious doctrine, but recognized that if discovery showed that 
the pastor’s claim required assessment of religious doctrine 
then summary judgment should be granted for the church, as 
“any inquiry into the Church’s reasons for asserting that 
[plaintiff] was not suited for a particular pastorship would 
constitute an excessive entanglement in its affairs”).  However, 
such cases are inapposite here where discovery has been 
completed, the parties do not dispute the existence of a 
contract, and the record demonstrates that further inquiry into 
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the Church’s reasons for terminating Lee would 
inappropriately intrude on internal Church doctrine and 
governance concerning a pastor’s fulfillment of his duties.  
In addition, Lee’s assertion that application of the ministerial 
exception here would allow the church to rely on civil courts 
to enforce its contracts but simultaneously invoke religion 
when a contracting party seeks to enforce the contract against 
the church is unavailing.  The ministerial exception does not 
apply to, and courts may decide, disputes that do not implicate 
ecclesiastical matters.  See Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208; 
Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 
1026-27 (N.D. Iowa 2007).   
     
For all of these reasons, the District Court correctly 
entered judgment in favor of the Church.     
           
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
